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AUTOMOBILES -REFUSALS OF TEST, ADMISSIBILITY:
NORTH DAKOTA'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AS APPLIED TO A REFUSAL TO SUBMIT
TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST
State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
On April 20, 1993, after receiving a call reporting a driver slumped
behind the wheel of a vehicle, the North Dakota Highway Patrol dis-
patched Trooper Ronald Duane Stanley to Cass County Road 26, north
of Gardner, North Dakota.' When Trooper Stanley arrived, he found a
vehicle parked two-thirds of the way onto the road just before a bridge.2
On the ground outside the driver's door, Trooper Stanley observed a
beer can. 3 Trooper Stanley then proceeded towards the car where he
found Daniel Beaton sleeping behind the steering wheel. 4 At this time,
Trooper Stanley removed the keys from the ignition, picked up the beer
can and placed both in his patrol car. 5 Upon awakening Beaton, Troop-
er Stanley surmised that Beaton had probably been drinking. 6 Trooper
Stanley then requested Beaton to perform field sobriety tests, which
1. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,646 (N.D. 1994); Brief of Appellee at 2, State v. Beaton, 516
N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994) (No. 93-0322) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
2. Appellee's Brief at 2, Beaton (No. 93-0322). This bridge is on the border between North
Dakota and Minnesota. Brief for Appellant at 1, State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994) (No.
93-0322) hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
3. Appellant's Brief at 1, Beaton (No. 93-0322). Trooper Stanley subsequently pulled behind the
suspect's vehicle and activated his take down lights. Transcript of Suppression Motion Proceedings at
5, State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994) (No. 93-0322). Take down lights are the lights on top
of a police car which shine white illuminating light to the front and yellow flashing strobes to the back.
Id. In this case, Trooper Stanley testified that these lights are not the ones used in signaling a person to
stop. Id.
4. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646.
5. Id. The engine was not running in Beaton's car and the vehicle's lights were not on.
Transcript of Suppression Motion Proceedings at 6, State v. Beaton, 516 N.W. 2d 645 (N.D. 1994)
(No. 93-0322). Several factors provide an officer with reasonable grounds to believe that an
individual is in actual physical control of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. 1975) (concluding that actual physical control was
present when the defendant was discovered slumped behind the wheel with the key in the ignition);
State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1976) (concluding that actual physical control existed
when the defendant was behind the wheel, the keys were in the ignition, the ignition was turned to the
"on" position, and the transmission was engaged); Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (Ohio
1976) (stating that actual physical control requires that the individual be in the driver's seat with
possession of the ignition key, and in a condition which enables the individual to start the engine and
move the vehicle); State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (N.D. 1977) (stating that the factors listed
in Schuler may not be mechanically applied, rather the main consideration should be whether the
conditions present demonstrate that the driver was in a position to regulate the movement of the
vehicle); Buck v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 425 N.W.2d 370, 371 (N.D. 1988)
(determining that the location of the vehicle and keys plus the condition of the driver are all factual
considerations); Fargo v. Theusch, 462 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (N.D. 1990) (concluding that actual
physical control does not depend exclusively on the location of the ignition key).
6. Transcript of Suppression Motion Proceedings at 7-8, Beaton (No. 93-0322). Trooper Stanley
observed Beaton's red, watery, bloodshot eyes in addition to smelling alcohol on Beaton's breath. Id.
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Beaton failed.7 Consequently, Beaton was arrested for being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. 8 After Beaton was arrested, handcuffed and placed in the
back seat of the patrol car, Trooper Stanley read an implied consent
advisory to Beaton and then inquired as to whether Beaton would take a
blood alcohol test. 9 However, Trooper Stanley did not, and was not
required, to advise Beaton that should Beaton refuse to take a blood
alcohol test, such refusal could be used against him at trial. 10 In other
words, Beaton failed to receive a Miranda warning prior to Trooper
7. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Beaton was asked to recite the alphabet and count backwards
from sixty-five to fifty-five. Transcript of Jury Proceedings at 13, 21, State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d
645 (ND. 1994) (No. 93-0322). He was also asked to perform a one leg stand test, a finger to nose
test, plus a walk and turn test. Id. at 22-23, 25.
8. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Section 39-08-01(1), of the North Dakota Century Code provides
in part:
I. A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a high-
way ... in this state if any of the following apply:
a. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths
of one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test
within two hours after the driving or being in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1) (Supp. 1993). Under this statute, actual physical control has been
defined as a driver having "real (not hypothetical), bodily restraining or directing influence over or
domination and regulation" of a vehicle. State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 1977) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Kloch, 327 A.2d 375, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)).
9. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Transcript of Suppression Motion Proceedings at 17, Beaton (No.
93-0322). North Dakota's implied consent advisory states that:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle on a highway ... in this state is deemed
to have given consent, and shall consent, subject to the provisions of this chapter, to a
chemical test, or tests, of the blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content ... of the blood.... The law enforcement officer shall
also inform the person charged that refusal of the person to submit to the test determined
appropriate will result in a revocation for up to three years of the person's driving
privileges. The law enforcement officer shall determine which of the tests is to be used.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1993). Apparently Beaton was asked if he would submit to the
test at least three times. Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings at 29, Beaton (No. 93-0322).
10. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test may be admitted as evidence in a civil or criminal
proceeding arising out of acts committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of
a vehicle and under the influence of alcohol. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1987). This statute was
amended in 1983 to provide for the admissibility of refusals regardless of whether the defendant
testifies at trial. 1983 N. D. Laws 415, § 30. By enacting this statute, the legislature intended that any
refusal to submit to blood alcohol testing be admitted in cases involving actual physical control or
driving under the influence. West Fargo v. Maring, 458 N.W.2d 318, 320 (N.D. 1990). However, title
39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code does not require a police officer to warn the arrestee that a
refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test can be admitted at trial against the defendant. N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 39-20-01 to -14 (1991).
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Stanley's request to take a blood alcohol test.1 I Ultimately, Beaton did
refuse to take a blood alcohol test. 12
At the suppression hearing, Beaton moved to suppress his statements
of refusal and to dismiss the case, arguing that a refusal to submit to a
blood alcohol test must be preceded by procedural safeguards in the
form of Miranda warnings.13 Beaton argued that such warnings were
required to protect his state constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion. 14 The motion to suppress was deniedl5 and a jury subsequently
convicted Beaton.16 Beaton appealed his conviction, contending that by
admitting his words of refusal as evidence, the state violated his privilege
against self-incrimination as set forth in the North Dakota Constitution.17
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the fact of refusal is admissi-
ble in evidence; however the specific statements of refusal constitute
testimonial evidence and are therefore inadmissible when a Miranda
warning is not given.18
11. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards that consist of a
two-part warning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The first part of the warning is that
an accused has the right to remain silent and any statement made may be used as evidence against the
accused. Id. The second part states that an arrested individual has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. Id. State v. Fasching, 453 N.w.2d 761, 762 (N.D. 1990)
(applying Miranda to a case involving statements made in a driving while under the influence case).
12. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646. Upon being asked to take a blood alcohol test, Beaton refused
simply by saying "no." Id. at 647. Trooper Stanley then replied that it would be recorded as a refusal.
Id. Beaton then responded by saying "well you've been very fair. I do not want to take the test." Id.
at 647-48.
13. See Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646 & n.3 (citing State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D.
1990)).
14. Id. at 648.
15. Id. at 648-49. The existence of a communication that is testimonial in nature is protected by
the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Metzner, 244 N.w.2d 215, 224-25
(N.D. 1976). However, the trial court judge determined that a refusal to submit to a chemical test fails
to constitute communicative or testimonial evidence. See Beaton. 516 N.W.2d at 646,647. Therefore,
evidence of a refusal obtained without Miranda warnings is admissible under either the federal or
state constitution. Id.
16. Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings at 117, Beaton (No. 93-0322).
17. Beaton, 516 N.w.2d at 646-47. The Constitution of North Dakota provides that "[n]o person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Beaton supports this ground for appeal by arguing that the final draft of the state constitution affords
greater protection to citizens than that of the federal constitution. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, State v.
Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994) (No. 93- 0322) (relying on Lynn Boughey, An Introduction to
North Dakota Constitutional Law: Content and Methods of Interpretation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 157, 256
(1987) (stating that the language of the state constitution is more expansive than its federal
counterpart)).
18. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649. The court later clarified that the fact of refusal may be admitted
at trial and considered as a factor in establishing guilt. State v. Murphy, 516 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D.
1994).
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II. LEGAL HISTORY
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
all individuals a privilege against self-incrimination.19 Likewise, North
Dakota also provides constitutional protection from self-incrimination. 20
Even though the federal and state privileges co-exist, the state privilege
may be construed differently to provide enhanced protection of individ-
ual rights.21 In construing the extent of a state constitutional privilege,
the state often looks to the federal interpretation of the United States
Constitution for guidance. 22 With regard to the privilege against self-
incrimination, the United States Supreme Court and the North Dakota
Supreme Court have both determined that the privilege protects an
individual from being compelled to disclose testimonial statements. 23 In
other words, two components must be met for this privilege to be appli-
cable.24 The first component focuses on whether the statements made by
the suspect were compelled.25 The second component concentrates on
whether the statement was testimonial in nature. 26 If both of these
requirements are met, then a defendant's statement will be inadmissible
at trial unless Miranda warnings preceded the statement at issue.27
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person ... shall be com-
pelled, in a criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Id.
20. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12. See supra note 17 for relevant text of N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12.
21. Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 766 (N.D. 1984) (concluding that the state constitu-
tion may provide greater protection to its citizens than the safeguards created by the federal
constitution); Boughey, supra note 17, at 270-71.
22. See, e.g., State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 817-18 (N.D. 1974) (determining that the state
constitutional provision involving double jeopardy should be interpreted consistently with the federal
clause); State v. Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 209 n.2 (N.D. 1990) (declining to adopt a more expansive
view of the state constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizures because defendant
provided no arguments as to why the state protection should be more expansive than the federal
protection); State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849, 853 n.2 (N.D. 1988) (declining to adopt a more
expansive view of the state constitutional provision regarding search); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171,
178 (N.D. 1985) (utilizing federal case law to determine the judicial interpretation of N.D. CONST. art.
I,§ 12).
23. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (stating that communication is
testimonial when it discloses information or related to a factual assertion); State v. Newnam, 409
N.W.2d 79, 82 (N.D. 1987) (stating that the text of both the federal and state privilege against self-
incrimination is worded similarly); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 410 (N.D. 1980) (determining that
North Dakota's privilege against self-incrimination constitutes the equivalent of the federal privilege);
State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 14 (N.D. 1971) (stating that the state privilege is the counterpart of the
federal privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Miller 146 N.W.2d 159, 165 (N.D. 1966)
(concluding that the state privilege is similar to the federal privilege).
24. See, e.g., Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590; Fischer v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1579 (1976);
McNamara v. Director of North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 500 N.W.2d 585, 592 (N.D. 1993); State v.
Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 764 (N.D. 1990).
25. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590; Miller, 146 N.W.2d at 165-66.
26. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590; Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d at 243, 244 (N.D. 1980); State v.
Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215, 225 (N.D. 1976).
27. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590.
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A. COMPELLED STATEMENTS
In Miranda v. Arizona,28 the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that custodial interrogation contains inherently compelling
pressures which undermine the suspect's ability to speak freely. 29 The
Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." 30 However,
since the invocation of this definition, courts have succinctly defined the
separate elements of custodial interrogation.
1. Custody
As stated in Miranda, warnings intended to protect a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right are only required when custody and interrogation
exist. 31 Originally, the Supreme Court explained that custody exists
when there has been a significant restraint on a person's freedom of
movement. 32 However, this standard's applicability is impaired because
it is difficult to identify when a substantial restraint on an individual's
freedom of movement actually occurs. 33 Therefore, the Court clarified
the standard by stating that "the ultimate inquiry in determining the
existence of custody is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with formal
arrest.'34
In 1984, the Court was faced with applying the standard for deter-
mining when custody occurs to non-arrest vehicular detention. 35 The
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 467 (1966). The Court reasoned that custodial
interrogation creates a police dominated atmosphere whereby suspects may be compelled to make
incriminating statements. Id. at 458. Therefore, suspects should be warned that they have the right to
remain silent and the right to an attorney before any police questioning begins. Id. at 478-79. The
Court concluded that such warnings would dispel any compulsion inherent in the custodial
interrogation process and thereby protect the suspect's Fifth Amendment right. Id. North Dakota has
incorporated this analysis of the Fifth Amendment compulsion aspect into its application of the state
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79, 82 (N. D. 1987);
State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 13 (N.D. 1971) (discussing N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 which is now N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 12).
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted).
31. id. General on-the-scene investigatory questioning regarding facts surrounding a crime or
other general questioning of citizens does not constitute custodial interrogation. id. at 477-78.
32. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977) (per curiam).
33. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (stating that a totality of
the circumstances test should influence the determination of whether the defendant is in custody).
34. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). The standard as set out in Beheler will be referred
to in the remainder of this article as the Mathiason-Beheler standard. See also Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420.430 (1984) (determining that the Mathiason-Beheler standard for determining custody is
to be narrowly construed).
35. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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Court stated that even though custody did not exist, restraint on the
freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest may be
present if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have
believed that she is no longer free to leave.36 Therefore, formal custody
or a suspect's reasonable belief of custody constitutes the first compo-
nent of custodial interrogation as defined by the United States Supreme
Court.
In State v. Fields,37 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
when law enforcement must issue Miranda warnings to ensure the
protection of the state privilege against self-incrimination. 38 The North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that Miranda warnings were required
once a suspect was in custody and interrogated. 39 The court defined
custody as an atmosphere or physical surroundings which manifest
restraint or compulsion.40 In 1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court
solidified this definition by relying on the standard utilized by the
United States Supreme Court. 41 Therefore, at the state level, custody
exists when there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.42 Additionally, the
court has implemented the objective test for determining when a restraint
on the freedom of movement to a degree associated with arrest occurs in
non-arrest vehicular detention. 43  Ultimately, custody as interpreted
under the state constitution, reflects the interpretation posed by the
United States Supreme Court.
2. Interrogation
In defining the requirement of interrogation, the United States
Supreme Court determined that interrogation occurs when express
questioning or the functional equivalent of questioning is initiated by
law enforcement officers.44 In applying this definition, the Court stated
that the functional equivalent of questioning occurs when the police, in
talking with the suspect, use words or actions which the police should
36. Id. at 442.
37. 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980).
38. State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404,408 (N.D. 1980).
39. Id. at 407; State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (N.D. 1989); State v. Pitman, 427
N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (N.D. 1988); State v. Berger. 329 N.W.2d 374, 376 (N.D. 1983).
40. Fields, 294 N.W.2d at 408.
41. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d at 83 (relying on the Beheler-Mathiason standard of custody identified
in text accompanying footnote 34 supra).
42. Id. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (containing the Beheler-Mathiason standard).
43. Cannery, 441 N.W.2d at 654; Pitman, 427 N.W.2d at 341. Supra note 36 and accompanying
text (identifying the objective test as whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
believe that she is no longer free to leave).
44. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,300-01 (1980).
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know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 45 Within
the parameters of this definition, the Court carved out a narrow excep-
tion to the classification of express questioning as interrogation.46 This
exception is triggered when the questions asked by law enforcement
officers are normally attendant to arrest and custody. 47 In creating this
exception, the Court reasoned that questions normally attendant to arrest
and custody do not elicit information for investigatory purposes and
therefore do not constitute the type of interrogation against which
Miranda was designed to guard. 48 Outside of this exception, Miranda
warnings must precede any questioning or its functional equivalent
initiated by law enforcement officers to ensure the protection of a
suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Correspondingly, North Dakota has adopted all aspects of the
federal interpretation of interrogation in construing the scope of the state
constitutional protection against self-incrimination .49 Therefore, to
satisfy North Dakota constitutional guarantees, Miranda warnings must
precede any questioning, or its functional equivalent, initiated by law
enforcement officers. These warnings are intended to ensure the protec-
tion of a suspect's state constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
Ultimately, to ensure the integrity of an individual's federal and
state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination, procedural
safeguards, in the form of Miranda warnings, must be given prior to any
custodial interrogation. 50 However, if these warnings are not given, a
violation of a suspect's federal or state privilege against self-incrimina-
tion will only occur if the statements elicited were testimonial in nature. 51
45. Innis,446 U.S. at 301.
46. Id.
47. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600 (1990) (relying on United States v. Horton, 873
F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989), to determine that questions such as name, address, height, weight,
eye color, date of birth, and current age constitute questions routine to the booking process). Innis,
446 U.S. at 301 (concluding that interrogation fails to exist when the police words or actions are
normally attendant to arrest and custody).
48. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,564 n.15 (1983).
49. State v. Larson, 343 N.W.2d 361,366 (N.D. 1984); see State v. Newnam. 409 N.W.2d 79. 83
n.2 (N.D. 1987) (stating that the court was not required to examine the police officer's conduct to
determine whether interrogation as defined by Innis existed); State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215, 223
(N.D. 1976) (determining that the police officer's questions were not coercive and were therefore
part of a routine investigation).
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
51. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590; Metzner, 244 N.W.2d at 225.
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B. TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extract
a communication from the suspect. 52 However, the scope of the word
"communication" does not extend to the exclusion of a suspect's
physical aspects when the physical aspects are material to the case. 53
Thus, the Court created a distinction between testimonial evidence, which
is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, and real evi-
dence, 54 which is not protected.55 The Court defined testimonial evi-
dence as a communication by the accused which implicitly or explicitly
relates to a factual assertion or discloses information. 56 The Court has
further determined that whenever a suspect is asked for a response
requiring her to communicate an express or implied factual assertion or
belief, the suspect confronts the cruel trilemma of silence, lying, or
telling the truth; hence the response contains a testimonial component. 57
Such a response contains a testimonial component because the content
of the suspect's answer allows a juror to infer a manifestation of inno-
cence or a manifestation of guilt.58 If the suspect answers in a manner
that the juror might reasonably expect of an innocent person, then this
would be construed as a manifestation of innocence. 59 If, on the other
hand, the response was not what a juror would reasonably believe an
innocent individual to make, then the suspect has inadvertently manifest-
ed a consciousness of guilt. 60 Therefore, whenever the suspect is asked
to respond to a question which forces him/her to choose between lying,
52. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
53. Id. The Court concluded that a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination is not threatened
when physical aspects are sought to be introduced because the suspect does not disclose any
knowledge or speak his guilt. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). Additionally, it is
the "extortion of information from the accused," the attempt to force him "to disclose the contents of
his own mind" that implicates the privilege against self-incrimination. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201,211 (1987) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) and Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118,128 (1957)).
54. See Black's Law Dictionary 1264 (6th ed. 1990). Real evidence is furnished by tangible
things that may be viewed or inspected rather than described by a witness. Id. Other examples of
physical evidence include participation in a "live" lineup, as well as providing handwriting or voice
exemplars. Wade, 388 U.S. at 222 (determining that an individual could participate in a lineup
because evidence of this sort was physical in nature); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67
(1967) (determining that a handwriting exemplar is a physical characteristic outside the protection of
the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (determining that a voice
exemplar is a physical characteristic outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment).
55. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,764 (1966).
56. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,210 (1988).
57. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,597 (1990).
58. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,649 (N.D. 1994); Muniz, 496 U.S. at 598-99.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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telling the truth, or remaining silent, the response is testimonial in
nature. 6 1 Such responses are protected by the Fifth Amendment. 62
By relying on the interpretations posed by the United States Su-
preme Court, North Dakota has signalled its adoption of the federal
interpretation of testimonial statements to the trial courts of the state.63
C. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING
SELF-INCRIMINATION TO REFUSALS TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL
TESTS
The United States Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California64 first
applied the concepts of custodial interrogation and testimonial evidence
to a case involving evidence obtained as a result of a blood alcohol test.65
Specifically, the Court focused on whether the test results constituted
testimonial evidence. 66 The Court concluded that the results of a blood
alcohol test are not testimonial in nature and that the suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination had not been violated.67 The Court reasoned
that the results of the blood alcohol test were not a product of petition-
er's testimonial capacities; in fact the only participation petitioner had
was that of a donor. 68 Therefore, the evidence was found to have been
obtained by the government's independent labors through drawing the
blood and testing it rather than compelling the testimony from the
suspect's own mouth.69 Additionally, the Court stated that general Fifth
Amendment principles would be applicable to cases involving the
admissibility of refusals to submit to chemical testing. 70
Subsequently, the Court had occasion to apply Fifth Amendment
principles to a case involving the admissibility of a refusal to submit to a
61. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597.
62. Id. at 599-600.
63. State v. Miller, 146 N.W.2d 159, 165-66 (N.D. 1966); State v. Gibson, 284 N.W. 218, 219
(N.D. 1938) (determining that testimonial statements given voluntarily are not violative of the state
privilege against self-incrimination).
64. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
65. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966). In Schmerber. the defendant was
involved in a car accident and taken to the hospital. Id. at 758. The police suspected alcohol to be
involved and thus directed the nurse at the hospital to withdraw a blood sample from the unwilling
suspect. Id. The results stemming from an analysis of the blood were admitted at trial. Id. at 759.
The defense objected to the admission of the results on many constitutional grounds, one of which was
the Fifth Amendment. Id.
66. Id. at 761. The Court did not address the custodial interrogation issue. Id. However. the
Court did find that compulsion to submit to the withdrawal of blood was present. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 765. Instead, the blood test results constituted real or physical evidence which is not
protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (defining the
difference between physical and testimonial evidence).
69. Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 762 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,460 (1966)).
70. ld. at 765.
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blood alcohol test.7 l In South Dakota v. Neville,72 the Court determined
that a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test could constitutionally be
admitted at trial as evidence. 73 The Court declined to identify whether a
defendant's refusal constituted testimonial evidence. 74 Instead, the Court
focused on the custodial interrogation issue and determined that a
request to take a blood alcohol test fails to rise to the type of custodial
interrogation Miranda was designed to protect.75 In making this deter-
mination, the Court relied on the narrow exception to the definition of
interrogation by concluding that a request to submit to a blood alcohol
test constitutes police words or actions that are "normally attendant to
arrest and custody." 76 Additionally, the Court found that blood alcohol
tests are so safe, painless, and commonplace, that they would not induce
a person to confess, unlike the procedures delineated in Miranda.77
Therefore, the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was not violated by admitting such refusals into evidence because
the request to take the test failed to constitute interrogation which would
compel a suspect to incriminate herself.78 Additionally, the procedures
utilized to effectuate the blood test were not so onerous that they would
induce a suspect to incriminate herself or induce a suspect to confess
rather than submit to the testing procedure.79
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz,80 the Court applied the preceding ratio-
nale to another case involving a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol
71. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,560 (1983).
72. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
73. Neville v. South Dakota, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983). In Neville. the police pulled over a
defendant who failed to stop at a stop sign. Id. at 554. Pursuant to the stop, the police officer asked
defendant to step out of the car. Id. Upon exiting the vehicle, the defendant staggered and fell against
the car to support himself. Id. The police officer detected alcohol on defendant's breath. Id.
Defendant then performed field sobriety tests, which he failed. Id. at 555. Defendant was then
arrested, Mirandized, and read an implied consent advisory which included a request to submit to a
blood alcohol test. Id. Defendant refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id. This refusal was then
admitted at trial. Id. at 556. Defendant objected to the admission of the refusal on the grounds that
such an admission would violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
74. Id. at 561-62. The distinction between physical and testimonial evidence is difficult in refusal
cases since the form of a refusal can be testimonial (speaking), physical (nodding), or a combination
of testimonial and physical. Id. at 562.
75. Id. at 564 n.15.
76. Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). See supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text (defining the exception to custodial interrogation). The police inquiry surrounding
the request to take a blood alcohol test is governed extensively by state law and is presented to all
suspects in essentially the same manner. Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 n.15.
77. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966). The
police action in Miranda focused on physically or psychologically forcing a suspect to confess. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., 436,447-48 (1966). Examples of such police action include deceptive
stratagems, relentless questioning in isolated, hostile environments, mutt and jeff routines otherwise
referred to as good cop/bad cop, and humiliation. Id. at 453, 455.
78. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563.
79. Id.
80. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
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test.81 However, Muniz entailed the obtaining of a refusal as well as other
statements made prior to a Miranda warning.82 The Court determined
that even though a Miranda warning was not given, the refusal was still
admissible as evidence.8 3 However, as in Neville, the Court failed to
establish whether a refusal constitutes testimonial evidence. 84 Instead, the
Court focused on the custodial interrogation issue. 85 The Court relied
on the narrow exception to the definition of interrogation in determining
that a request to submit to a blood alcohol test constituted a limited and
focused inquiry necessarily attendant to legitimate police procedure. 86
The Court reasoned that such an inquiry is not likely to be interpreted as
a request for incriminating evidence. 87 Accordingly, the Court conclud-
ed that the refusal was not prompted by an interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda and therefore, the absence of Miranda warnings
did not require suppression. 88
Although the federal privilege against self-incrimination does not
protect a suspect's statement with regard to a refusal to submit to a blood
alcohol test, a state may construe its privilege differently to provide more
protection for such refusals. 89 However, in the area of refusals to submit
to blood alcohol testing, a majority of states have interpreted their state
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination synonymously with the
81. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
82. Id. In Muniz, a police officer spotted defendant's car parked on the shoulder of the highway.
Id. at 585. Upon stopping to inquire if the defendant was in need of assistance, the police officer
observed that defendant had red, watery, eyes and smelled of alcohol. Id. Defendant was then asked
to perform field sobriety tests which he failed. Id. Muniz was then arrested and taken to the police
station where he was videotaped answering questions and performing field sobriety tests. Id. The
questions directed toward Muniz during the videotape session ranged from his name to the date of his
sixth birthday. Id. at 586. See also supra note 47. Additionally, Muniz was requested to take a blood
alcohol test. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 586. Muniz refused to take the test. Id. The tape, as well as Muniz's
answers to the questions, were admitted at trial. Id. at 587. Defendant challenged the admissibility of
this evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. The Court determined that all of the questions with the
exception of the sixth birthday question constituted routine booking questions. Id. at 601. The sixth
birthday question was classified as testimonial because the suspect was confronted with the cruel
trilemma of speaking the truth, saying nothing, or lying. Id. at 598-99. Whenever a suspect is
confronted with this trilemma in answering a question he is required to communicate an express or
implied assertion of fact or belief. Id. at 597. Testimonial evidence has been defined as a
communication by the accused which expressly or implicitly relates an assertion of fact or belief. Id.
at 594.
83. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 605.
84. Id. at 604-05.
85. Id. at 604.
86. Id. at 605. The Court stated that the police officer had carefully limited her role to providing
Muniz with relevant information about the breathalyzer test. Id. at 605. The only questions asked of
Muniz concerning the breathalyzer were whether he would submit and whether he understood the
penalty for refusing. Id.
87. Id. at 605.
88. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 605.
89. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that states have the freedom to construe
state constitutional provisions independently from the interpretation attached to the federal privilege).
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federal position. 90 On the other hand, a minority of states have resolved
that a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test fails to fall under the
protective umbrella afforded by the state privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.91
Previously, the North Dakota Supreme Court has not had an oppor-
tunity to interpret the state privilege against self-incrimination as applied
in the arena of refusals to submit to blood alcohol testing. 92 As stated
however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has otherwise interpreted the
general components of the state privilege against self-incrimination by
relying on the decisions proferred by the United States Supreme Court. 93
Therefore, these interpretations would likely be applicable in a state-
based self-incrimination case regarding a refusal to submit to a blood
alcohol test.
III. ANALYSIS
In State v. Beaton,94 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the
application of North Dakota's state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination to refusals made pursuant to a request for a blood
alcohol test.95 Previously, the court had relied on section 39-20-0896 of
90. E.g., Cox v. People, 735 P.2d 153, 157 (Colo. 1987) (concluding that Colorado's privilege
against self-incrimination is no broader than the federal constitution and that Neville controls); State v.
Durrant, 188 A.2d 526, 528 (Del. 1963) (determining that a refusal is not obtained from a compulsory
oral examination and therefore, admission of the refusal would not violate the state constitution); State
v. Sowers, 442 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on Neville in stating that a refusal is
not the product of compulsion and does not violate Florida's constitution); Commonwealth v. Hager,
702 S.W.2d 431,432 (Ky. 1986) (relying on Neville in stating that a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol
test is admissible under the state constitution); State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 258 (Mont. 1983)
(determining that a state constitution is no broader than the federal constitution regarding
self-incrimination whereby Neville controls); State v. Cormier, 499 A.2d 986, 988 (N.H. 1985)
(concluding that a state's privilege against self-incrimination is comparable in scope to the Fifth
Amendment); New York v. Thomas, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 849 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that even though a
refusal is testimonial it is not compelled and may be admitted without violating the state constitution);
Dennis v. State, 725 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that the Texas constitutional
provisions as to self-incrimination are no broader than the federal ones, therefore Neville applies);
State v. Albright, 298 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that evidence obtained by a
breathalyzer test is not testimonial and not protected by the state privilege against self-incrimination).
91. E.g., State v. Adams. 247 S.E.2d 475, 478 (W. Va 1978) (concluding that a defendant's
refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test may not constitutionally be admitted); In Re Baggett, 531 P.2d
1011, 1020-21 (Okla. 1974) (stating that the Oklahoma self-incrimination privilege is broader than the
federal privilege therefore a refusal is inadmissible); State v. Andrews, 212 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn.
1973) (determining that a refusal to submit to a blood test is both compelled and testimonial therefore it
is inadmissible at trial).
92. Transcript of Suppression Proceedings at 24, State v. Beaton, 516 N.W. 2d 645 (N.D. 1994)
(No. 93-0322).
93. See supra notes 49, 63 and accompanying text (stating that North Dakota has adopted the
federal interpretations of custodial interrogation and testimonial evidence).
94. 516 N.W.2d 645.
95. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994).
96. N.D. CENr. CODE § 39-20-08 (1987) (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1983)).
Section 39-20-08 provides that:
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the North Dakota Century Code in admitting evidence of such refusals. 97
Under this statute, a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test was admissi-
ble in any civil or criminal proceeding. 98 However, Beaton challenged
the constitutionality of this statute by relying on the state privilege
against self-incrimination. 99 The court concluded that the fact of refusal
is admissible but any specific statements made by the defendant in
refusing to take a blood alcohol test were testimonial and thus inadmissi-
ble.l 00 In reaching this decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court
examined the separate components of the state privilege against self-
incrimination. 101
A. CUSTODY
As previously stated, the North Dakota Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated the federal interpretation of "custody" into the state privilege
against self-incrimination.10 2 This interpretation focuses on whether a
formal arrest or restraint on the freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest has occurred.l0 3 However, in Beaton, the
court did not identify whether this was the interpretation being ap-
plied.104 Rather, the court simply stated that Beaton was clearly in
custody when Trooper Stanley requested the blood test because Beaton
was arrested, handcuffed, and seated in the back seat of the patrol car
when the request was made.1 05  Therefore, although the court did not
If the person under arrest refuses to submit to the test or tests, proof of refusal is
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle
upon the public highways while under the public highways while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, drugs, or a combination thereof.
ID. See also supra note 10.
97. State v. Murphy, 516 N.W.2d 285, 286 (N.D. 1994) (concluding that proof of refusal is
admissible as evidence under section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code); City of West
Fargo v. Maring, 458 N.W.2d 318, 319 (N.D. 1990) (stating that section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code explicitly permits any refusals may be admitted as evidence); see State v. Severson, 75
N.W.2d 316, 317 (N.D. 1956) (relying on an earlier version of section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code by stating that a refusal may not be admitted as evidence unless the defendant testifies in
court).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1983), amended by N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1987). See
supra note 96.
99. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646-47.
100. Id. at 649.
101. Id. at 648-49.
102. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (identifying the standard to be used in deter-
mining custody).
104. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,649 (N.D. 1994).
105. Id.
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identify its interpretation of custody, it did remain consistent with the
standard applied in the past by determining that a formal arrest consti-
tutes custody.106
B. INTERROGATION
As previously stated, the North Dakota Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated the federal interpretation of interrogation into the state privilege
against self-incrimination. 107 This interpretation focuses on the exis-
tence of express questioning or its functional equivalent as identified by
Innis.108 However, interrogation is deemed to be nonexistent when the
questions asked by the police are normally attendant to arrest and
custody.109 Federal courts have determined that interrogation fails to
exist and Miranda warnings are not required when a request is made to
submit to a blood alcohol test.110 In making this determination, the
courts have concluded that such a request constitutes questioning nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody.111 This type of questioning places
no coercion upon the suspect to incriminate herself.11 2 However, in
Beaton, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that coercion does
exist when a police officer requests a blood alcohol test. 113 In reaching
this conclusion, the court first examined the Miranda decision.11 4 The
court relied on this decision by quoting a passage of Miranda.115 This
quote states that the prosecution may not use statements made by the
suspect during custodial interrogation when Miranda warnings failed to
precede such interrogation."l 6 The court further relied on Miranda's
definition of custodial interrogation.1 7 However, the court made no
mention of Neville's determination that custodial interrogation fails to
exist when the questions asked are ones normally attendant to arrest and
custody."i8 In fact, the only reference to the Neville decision was made
106. Id.
107. State v. Larson, 343 N.W.2d 361,366 (N.D. 1984).
108. State v. Newnam. 409 N.W. 2d 79, 83 n.2 (N.D. 1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-01 (1990).
109. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600 (1990).
110. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. North Dakota also appears to have adopted this exception to
interrogation. See State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215, 223 (N.D. 1976) (determining that the police
officer's questions were not coercive and therefore constituted part of a routine investigation).
111. See, Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-01.
112. See South Dakota v. Nelville, 459 U.S. 553,564 n.15 (1983).
113. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,649 n.5 (N.D. 1994).
114. Id. at 648.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 649.
117. Id.
118. Beaton. 516 N.W.2d at 649. The Court in Neville concluded that a request to submit to a
blood alcohol test is questioning normally attendant to arrest and therefore not interrogation for
purposes of Miranda. South Dakota v. Nelville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983).
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in a footnote.11 9 In this footnote, the court distinguished the Neville
opinion from the current case. 120 The court based this distinction on the
fact that Miranda warnings had been given to the defendant in Neville
which dispelled the compulsion surrounding the request to take a blood
alcohol test. 12 1 After quoting Miranda and distinguishing Neville, the
court then concluded that coercion is present when a request to submit to
a blood alcohol test is made while the suspect is in custody. 122 The court
then determined that Beaton was clearly in custody because he was
arrested and handcuffed.123 Therefore, Trooper Stanley's request to
submit to a blood alcohol test constituted custodial interrogation and
Beaton was entitled to his Miranda warnings.124 However, the court did
not specifically address whether a request to submit to a blood alcohol
test constitutes interrogation as contemplated by Miranda.125 In fact, the
court did not specifically state that interrogation was present.1 2 6 The
court simply inferred it by quoting Miranda, distinguishing the Neville
case, and then stating that impermissible coercion was present.12 7 The
North Dakota Supreme Court's classification of such a request as
interrogation is surprising since the United States Supreme Court has
clearly stated that such a request is not interrogation.128 Additionally, it
seems unusual for the court to deviate from the federal interpretation
since the court has relied on it in the past.129 Ultimately, the reasoning
behind the court's decision to classify a request to submit to a blood
alcohol test as interrogation is unclear.
Since the court expressly determined that custody existed and
impliedly determined that interrogation was present, it logically follows
119. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649 n.5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 649.
123. Id.
124. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Compare Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649 (determining that compulsion exists when an officer
requests a blood alcohol test without the benefit of a Miranda warning) with Pennsylvania v. Muniz,
496 U.S. 582, 604 n.19 (1990) (determining that compulsion fails to exist when an officer requests a
blood alcohol test without the benefit of a Miranda warning). However, in Beaton the court did not
distinguish the Muniz case. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649. The Muniz case contains a fact pattern that is
identical with the events occurring in Beaton. Compare Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646 (stating that the
defendant was requested to take a blood alcohol test before Miranda warnings were given) with
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 582 (stating that the defendant was requested to take a blood alcohol test before
Miranda warnings were given). Therefore, it seems strange that the court makes no mention of the
refusal issue decided in Muniz when determining the Beaton case.
129. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity between the federal and
state privileges against self-incrimination).
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that Miranda warnings were required.1 30 In this case, the Miranda
warnings were not given, therefore the admission of Beaton's refusal
would be unconstitutional if the refusal constituted testimonial evi-
dence. 13 1
C. TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
As previously stated, the North Dakota Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated the federal interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination
into the state privilege. 132 In Beaton, the court began its analysis of this
issue by examining the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Schmerber.1 33 The court relied on Schmerber to establish that the reach
of the privilege against self-incrimination only extends to statements that
are testimonial in nature. 134 The court then reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Muniz to define testimonial evidence as a
communication by the accused which explicitly or implicitly relates a
factual assertion or discloses information.135 The court also appears to
incorporate the Muniz determination that a response to a question relates
to a factual assertion or discloses information when the suspect is con-
fronted with the trilemma of telling the truth, remaining silent, or ly-
ing.136 By relying on this definition, the court in Beaton concluded that
his statements of refusal were testimonial communications because they
explicitly or implicitly related a factual assertion or disclosed informa-
tion.137 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not delineate how a
statement of refusal explicitly or implicitly relates a factual assertion or
discloses information.138 The court simply reviewed the decisions in
Schmerber and Muniz and then concluded that a refusal relates a factual
assertion or discloses information and is thereby testimonial in nature.139
The court did state that Beaton's response would allow a juror to infer
that the statement of refusal was a manifestation of guilt.140 However, the
court declined to address why such a response would allow a juror to
130. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649.
131. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966)).
132. State v. Pauley, 192 N.W. 91,92 (N.D. 1923) (concluding that testimonial compulsion with
regard to the United States Constitution is embodied within N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13, which is now
contained in N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12).
133. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,648-49 (N.D. 1994).
134. Id. at 649.
135. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201,210 (1988)); Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649.
136. Id. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (defining what the cruel trilemma is and
when a response to a question constitutes testimonial evidence).
137. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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infer a manifestation of guilt. 14 1 The North Dakota Supreme Court's
lack of explanation is especially interesting because the United States
Supreme Court has explicitly avoided classifying a refusal as a testimoni-
al communication. 14 2
Additionally, the court in Beaton determined that the fact of refusal
may be admissible regardless of whether Miranda warnings were given
prior to the request for a blood alcohol test.143 In making this determin-
ation, the court did not explain why the fact of refusal fails to constitute
testimonial evidence as compared to the classification of specific state-
ments of refusal as testimonial evidence. 144
Finally, the court declined to decide if a simple "no" in response to
a request to submit to a blood alcohol test constituted testimonial evi-
dence.1 45 In doing so, the court seemed to indicate that only some
responses to a request for a blood alcohol test would be classified as
testimonial.146 However, the court did not specifically state why or how
such a distinction can be made. The court simply dropped a footnote
and stated that it need not determine whether a simple "no" constitutes
testimonial evidence because in this case there was more. 147
Justice Levine's dissent argued that the testimonial issue need not be
addressed since a request to submit to a blood alcohol test was question-
ing normally attendant to arrest and custody.148 In relying upon federal
law the dissent determined that such questioning fails to rise to the type
of interrogation Miranda was designed to protect.149 The dissent rea-
soned that since the request to submit to a blood alcohol test is highly
regulated by state law and is presented in virtually the same manner to all
suspects it constitutes questioning normally attendant to arrest and
custody.150 Therefore, the dissent concluded, Miranda warnings are not
required as a precondition for a defendant's statements of refusal to be
admitted at trial.151
141. Id.
142. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561-62 (1983).
143. Beaton, 516 N.w.2d at 649.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 649 n.7.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 650 (Levine, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,564 n.15 (1983)).
151. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 582 (1990) and Neville, 459 U.S. at 564
n.15).
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IV. IMPACT
The impact of this decision is unclear. For example, the North
Dakota Supreme Court did not identify why a request to submit to a
blood alcohol test constitutes interrogation. Therefore, police officers
will not know what questions they can ask of a suspect before Miranda
warnings must be given. Furthermore, judges will be unable to apply the
supreme court's new interpretation of interrogation. This interpretation
of interrogation deviates from its federal counterpart. Accordingly,
judges cannot rely on the federal interpretation as a guide in determin-
ing future cases. Also, the court in Beaton declined to delineate the state
standard being utilized in determining that a request to submit to a blood
alcohol test constitutes interrogation protected by Miranda. Therefore,
judges will be unable to rely on Beaton to determine whether interroga-
tion exists under the state constitution.
Additionally, in making the determination that interrogation is
present when an officer requests a blood alcohol test, the court appears
to disregard the exception to interrogation created by the United States
Supreme Court and mentioned by Justice Levine in the dissent. This
exception provides that questions normally attendant to arrest and
custody fail to constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes.1 52 It is
arguable then that the exception to interrogation, involving questions
normally attendant to arrest and custody, has not been adopted by North
Dakota in construing its state constitution. However, because the court
declined to state why this exception did not exist in Beaton, judges in
future cases will be unable to apply North Dakota's interpretation of
interrogation.
The court's conclusion that a refusal constitutes testimonial evi-
dence will impact North Dakota law. Prior to Beaton the court had
incorporated the federal definition of testimonial evidence into the
state's interpretation of article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Consti-
tution. 153 However, the court in Beaton determined that a refusal consti-
tutes testimonial evidence. 154 This is an issue the United States Supreme
Court has expressly declined to address due to the difficulty of distin-
guishing evidence that is testimonial and evidence that is real.155 Since
the United State Supreme Court refuses to apply the testimonial distinc-
tion to a refusal, and Beaton does not state why a refusal constitutes
152. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301 (1980).
153. State v. Miller, 146 N.W.2d 159, 165-66 (N.D. 1966); State v. Gibson, 284 N.W. 209,
218-19 (N.D. 1938).
154. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,649 (N.D. 1994).
155. Neville, 459 U.S. at 562.
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testimonial evidence, subsequent judges and prosecutors will logically
have difficulty in determining whether a statement is testimonial in
nature.
After Beaton, prosecutors will face more of a challenge in arguing
cases involving intoxication. Since a suspect's statements of refusal can
no longer be admitted at trial, the prosecutor is limited to the introduc-
tion of the results surrounding the field sobriety test as well as the fact
that the defendant refused. Such a limitation may result in more acquit-
tals of drunk drivers. Additionally, the hope of acquittal may cause
more suspects to refuse blood alcohol tests. If more suspects are encour-
aged to refuse a blood alcohol test, the purpose underlying section
39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code will be defeated. 156
Finally, by requiring Miranda warnings to be given before a request to
submit to a blood alcohol test, Beaton may result in confusion on the
part of a suspect. When a suspect is advised of his/her Miranda rights
and then asked to submit to a blood alcohol test, confusion as to whether
the suspect may truly remain silent exists.157 This is magnified by the
court's determination that silence on the part of the suspect in response
to a request for a blood alcohol test constitutes a refusal,158 the fact of
which may be admitted at trial.159
Based on the above analysis, it appears that the impact Beaton will
have on North Dakota law is ultimately unclear.
Heidi M. Volk
156. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1991).
157. Hammeren v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 315 N.W.2d 679, 682 (N.D. 1982)
(stating that a per se confusion doctrine does not exist in North Dakota rather the existence of
confusion should be determined on an ad hoc basis); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 410 (N.D. 1980)
(stating that an arrested person does not have the constitutional right to remain silent when asked
whether or not he will submit to a blood alcohol test).
158. See Fields, 294 N.W.2d at 410 (stating that a defendant may refuse to take a blood alcohol
test by remaining silent or by giving a negative answer).
159. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 649.
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